The usual result of the electoral theater:
The fascist system with a mask of democracy won, the people who gave the system “democratic legitimacy” lost!
The Presidential and Parliamentary Election of 2023 concluded with a swift “final scene,” and the curtain closed on May 28th. Turkey woke up on May 29th once again under Erdoğan’s “chiefhood”.
According to the opposition, in reality, the elections would be won in the first round, and Turkey would start on May 15th with a “New Spring.” No matter who stood against Erdogan, he would definitely win. To the extent that discussions were taking place on social media speculating that even a “toilet slipper” would win as a candidate! Eren Erdem, the vice president in charge of social media affairs for the CHP, before the election, discussed on a Halk TV “debate” program that (in a survey he personally funded) an “Empty Cola Can” candidate put up against Erdoğan received 48% of the votes, while Erdogan lagged behind at 34%! Ultimately, the results of 20 different “public opinion research firms,” out of which 18 were considered “scientific” studies, clearly indicated that Kılıçdaroğlu would win in the first round. Some even proclaimed that this victory would be by a substantial margin of 60% to 40%. Kılıçdaroğlu, in his humble demeanor and remarkable political foresight, even went as far as to say, “What do you mean, sir, it will be more than that.” With these inflated expectations, the bourgeois opposition and a section of the left entered the first round of the presidential election. Yet, it didn’t turn out as anticipated.
On May 15th, it became evident that the AKP/MHP partnership had secured a parliamentary majority, and it was almost certain that Erdogan would win the run-off in the presidential election. However, for the bourgeois opposition and the “leftist” opposition trailing behind, the situation wasn’t entirely hopeless. What do they mean by not abandoning hope? (According to them) the candidate of the bourgeois opposition and its loyal “leftist” supporters — “I’m Kemal, I’m coming,” “I promise you: New Springs will come,” “Mr. Kemal” the embodiment of “gentle power” — abandoned the role of a pacifier and opened the final act of the 14-day drama by firmly pounding the table with his fist, declaring “I am here, we will win!” The table-pounding didn’t appear very genuine, but it was acceptable. After all, it was necessary to uplift the morale of the demoralized voter base. Moreover, it was also a message directed at the internal opposition within the party that was beginning to raise its head slightly, at İmamoğlu, who had his eyes on his “father’s” seat, and of course, primarily aimed at the alliance constituent the Good Party, who was preparing to say “didn’t we tell you so?”
This final act was undoubtedly much more dramatic than the earlier acts that I cannot count. For the political representatives of the two factions of the bourgeoisie engaged in their power struggle, and for the left tailists who considered trailing behind the “opposition” as “doing politics,” the outcome of these elections was extremely important. Not only for them but also for Western imperialist media and the imperialist forces behind them, these elections were the “most crucial elections in 2023 to be held worldwide.” In the place where it became apparent that the majority in the parliament had been lost, the only remaining hope for the “opposition” was the second-round victory of the Turkish-style (Alaturca) presidency. When this happened, Kılıçdaroğlu — along with İmamoğlu on his right, Yavaş on his left, and his allies at the table of six and beyond — would, of course, exercise these powers. And, of course, the use of these powers was essential for the transition to a strengthened parliamentary democracy over time! The list of things to be done with the “presidential decree” from the very first day was complete. The announcement had already been made. Admittedly, this contradicted some of the previous statements, declarations of intent, and so on. After all, previously it had been declared that in this “bizarre system,” the presidency held too many powers, was very undemocratic, and so on, and if elected, those powers wouldn’t be utilized. But “whatever.” There were other things previously said as well. For instance, the presidential candidate must definitely not be a party leader, and so on. Ultimately, what was said yesterday had remained in the past; now new things had to be said. There was no other way to topple the one-man dictatorship! Now what needed to be done was to cease unnecessary debates and work together more efficiently, first and foremost, ensuring the protection of the ballot boxes! And since protecting the ballot boxes was already successful, winning the election was assured!
Dreams / Hopes / and the Truth
When these were said, “mathematics” of the election results from May 14th, objective reality and facts were as follows:
In an election with a participation rate of over 87%, in the first round, Erdoğan had a significant lead, surpassing his closest rival Kılıçdaroğlu by nearly 5% and establishing a surplus vote of 2.5 million. While Erdoğan only needed to increase his first-round votes by 0.5% to secure a victory in the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu required over 10 times that rate, an increase of over 5%. The probability for the votes that went to Sinan Oğan and Muharrem İnce in the first round aligning towards Kılıçdaroğlu as a whole in the second round was close to zero. In other words, claiming victory in the second round was attempting the impossible.
Furthermore, Kılıçdaroğlu’s statements during his interview with Emin Özgül from Sözcü newspaper on May 2nd, regarding the possibility of the election going to a second round, were proven to be empty with the results of the Presidential and Parliamentary elections on May 14th. In response to the question, he once again voiced his claims: “The May 14th election will not go to the second round; it will end in the first round. I will be elected as the 13th President of the Republic of Turkey with 60% of the votes in the first round. I have confidence in the youth. They will determine the fate of the election. Over 5.3 million young people will cast their votes for the first time. These young people are not satisfied with the current system. We will secure a majority in the parliament and bring a strengthened parliamentary system.” However, these assertions had firmly taken their place in the realm of dreams and hopes, irreversibly, with the results of the May 14th Presidential and Parliamentary elections.
The definitive results of the May 14, 2023 Parliamentary Elections, following the resolution of subsequent appeals, are as follows:
Final Results of the 14 May 2023 Parliamentary Elections
Distribution of Deputies in the Parliament
In an election with a participation rate exceeding 87%, the combined vote percentage for the government coalition consisting of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) stands at 46.03%. Collectively, they secured 318 out of the 600 available seats. When we factor in the figures for the Felicity Party led by Fatih Erbakan, which contested independently as part of the People’s Alliance coalition, the overall voting percentage for the ruling bloc climbs to 48.71%, accompanied by a rise in the number of Members of Parliament to 323.
As the second round approached, a clear majority of eligible voters had cast their ballots in favor of maintaining the current administration. Despite extremely favorable conditions for the opposition — including 21 years of fatigue and erosion within the ruling party, challenging economic circumstances for the people, the weight of a two-year-long pandemic crisis, the atmosphere of war, and lastly, the political accountability for one of the most significant earthquakes in the history of the Republic of Turkey — this was the resulting outcome. For most voters, this had only one meaning: A continued faith in the regime rather than in the opposition. To anticipate any change in the stance of the voter majority within a mere two weeks, given these circumstances, would not be political optimism, but rather might be best described as political blindness.
Indeed, the results of the second round confirmed this:
However, the following observation came to light: Even after May 14th, a significant faction of believers persisted in asserting “We will win!” — some even convinced themselves that they had indeed emerged victorious. This was a community not to be underestimated, prepared to embrace any belief, regardless of its irrationality, and endorse even the most far-fetched narratives in their unyielding pursuit of victory, no matter what. Such a community was even willing to support Kılıçdaroğlu, who, after May 14th, managed to outpace the MHP in terms of promoting racism and fascist nationalism, viewing it as a necessary stride toward advancing “democracy.”
For the bourgeois opposition, particularly its constituents whose essence isn’t markedly different from Erdogan’s, this disposition can be “understood.” After all, the entirety of the bourgeois opposition’s political strategy for “victory” was constructed upon being in opposition to Erdoğan. Ironically, they themselves began to resemble Erdoğan, reshaping their parties into variants of the AKP, all for the sake of victory. Kılıçdaroğlu positioned himself as a devout among the Sunni bigots, Pir among Alewis, Kurdish among Kurds, Grey Wolf among MHP supporters, and Atatürkist among Kemalists — adapting to each situation with seemingly authentic personas.
However, even in the face of Kılıçdaroğlu’s overt alliance with Ümit Özdağ, a prominent advocate of racism in Turkey’s bourgeois politics, what do we say for our “leftist” comrades who still call for votes? How do we address those, even within our own circles, who sided with leftist friends who cast their votes? Politically elucidating this scenario is undoubtedly challenging! Undeniably, this situation brings shame to those who identify as democrats, leftists, and revolutionaries, and it continues to do so.
When we analyze the victor of the electoral theater in its entirety, the triumphant force remains the fascist establishment of the ruling exploitative classes — a pattern observed in all prior elections. Presently, this fascist structure is under the governance of the AKP/MHP, but it’s not exclusively their creation. The governmental framework in Turkey embodies fascism. Even if Erdoğan were to step aside, making way for someone like Kılıçdaroğlu or another figure, the essence would remain unaltered. The fascist structure would endure — conceivably with different leaders, a few superficial reforms and refinements, yet essentially unaltered. The real losers of the election are, as is customary, the individuals who continue to pin their hopes on periodically conducted elections and, with their every valid vote, effectively gifted this fascist system a scarf of “democrat football club.” Until these laborers and workers fully comprehend this reality and start to view the overthrow of bourgeois rule as the sole path to redemption, this cycle will persist.
As long as the “left,” which frequently entertains the notion of following the lesser evil and deems guiding workers and laborers to align with the lesser evil as a sophisticated electoral strategy, maintains its sway over these groups, this cycle will endure.
It falls upon communists and authentic revolutionaries to avert this scenario.
This stands as the most pivotal lesson to glean from these elections.
2023 Elections / Drama / 9 Acts
1.Act
The electoral drama of 2023 effectively commenced immediately after the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections conducted in June 2018. Its roots can be traced even further back, to the June 2015 elections and, subsequently, the November elections. However, for the sake of the conciseness, we’ll focus on the General Election just preceding 2023.
The General Election of June 2018 witnessed the bourgeois opposition, which had suffered defeats on both the Presidential and Parliamentary fronts, adamantly rejecting the outcomes of the election from the outset.
Their main arguments for this stance were centered around two key points.
Firstly, the argument they put forth was that Erdoğan lacked the qualifications to be elected. Doubts were cast upon the authenticity of his university diploma, with claims that he didn’t possess one at all. The approval of Erdoğan’s candidacy by the Supreme Election Board was contended as showcasing bias and unlawful conduct. Even if Erdogan managed to secure the presidency, his legitimacy would supposedly remain questionable, and so forth. At this juncture, the opposition appeared to overlook the fact that Erdoğan had previously been elected as President in 2014, with his eligibility duly confirmed. Consequently, the arguments presented on this matter held little real weight in terms of thwarting Erdoğan’s candidacy and subsequent election.
Secondly, the contention was that Erdoğan hadn’t genuinely won the election. Amid the election process, the Supreme Election Board altered the regulations, determining that envelopes lacking the official seal of the Supreme Election Board (yet carrying the seal of the ballot committees) would still hold validity. This verdict was seen as introducing fraudulent elements into the election, seemingly favoring Erdoğan.
Furthermore, even during the vote-counting process, the state-run TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation) momentarily halted its broadcast while releasing preliminary election results. When broadcasting resumed, Erdoğan was shown leading and eventually emerging as the victor in the first round. However, in reality, Erdoğan hadn’t secured victory in the first round; the election was headed for a second round. Yet, the Supreme Election Board had already proclaimed Erdoğan as the first-round winner.
Muharrem İnce, the candidate of the CHP in the election, legitimized these questionable election results. He called Fox TV host İsmail Küçükkaya in the middle of the night and declared that “The man has won,” before appeals had been settled. This action seemed to pinpoint the supposed cause of the election loss. On the day following the election, Muharrem İnce, effectively branded the scapegoat, seemingly handed the presidency to Erdoğan on a silver platter. Thus, Erdoğan ascended to power through an entirely dubious election. His occupancy of the presidency lacked legitimacy; his presence in that position, even for a single day, couldn’t be considered legitimate. Erdoğan’s claim to the presidential seat was flawed from the very beginning, and he should never have occupied that position for five years or even a day.
As the bourgeois opposition refused to acknowledge the elected President as legitimate, a profound political crisis erupted. Turkey couldn’t bear the weight of this crisis for an extended duration. The possibility of a new election would soon come into play. Erdoğan would likely be coerced into organizing a new election in the not-so-distant future, and so forth…
The bourgeois opposition, proponents of these assertions, possessed a potent tool at their disposal — if only they had truly heeded their rhetoric. They could have triggered public unrest by orchestrating the resignation of all their elected parliamentarians after the presidential election, rallying people to their cause, and potentially compelling a fresh election. However, they refrained from taking this course of action. After all, parliamentary seats offered comfort, accompanied by considerable perks and privileges for those holding them! Not all newly elected parliament members might have been willing to endorse such a path.
Furthermore, naturally, the streets aren’t perceived as a particularly secure domain from the bourgeoisie’s vantage point. When the streets come alive, it becomes challenging to anticipate the course events might take.
(Let’s pause for a moment and recall that in the 2018 elections, the HDP entered the initial round of the Presidential election with their own candidate, rather than as tailists.
In this election, not only the HDP but also the Good Party, the Felicity Party, and the Patriotic Party, alongside the CHP and AKP, fielded their respective candidates. Before the elections, the CHP/Good Party/Felicity Party/Democrat Party, which had united against the new constitution introduced by the Alaturca presidency system following the 2017 referendum, and named themselves as the “Nation’s Alliance,” took part in the elections with their individual candidates — except for the DP.
HDP’s presidential candidate, Demirtaş, secured third place in the election with 8.40%. In the parliamentary elections, HDP emerged as the third-largest party in the parliament, garnering an 11.70% share of the votes and obtaining 69 seats. During this period, HDP also echoed the bourgeois opposition’s skepticism regarding the election’s legitimacy. However, it, too, refrained from taking significant action, such as exiting the parliament, mobilizing the streets, or advocating for a compelled election. It didn’t adopt an assertive stance to steer the bourgeois opposition in that direction. Despite enduring substantial pressures, such as the state’s imposition of trustees on its elected municipalities, HDP did not opt for this course of action.)
2018 Presidential Election Results
2018 Parliamentary Election Results
Distribution of Members of Parliament
Amid the fervent calls for an early election, Erdoğan secured his mandate, assembled his cabinet, and steadily advanced the Alaturca presidential system, despite previous doubts about his governance capabilities. With a solid parliamentary majority at his disposal, he navigated through the process with relatively few disruptions.
And thus, the First Act came to a close.
2.Act
Before the Local Elections on March 31, 2019 (Municipal Elections), the Good Party (İYİ Parti), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) — in collaboration with the Democrat Party (DP) — formed the Nation Alliance. They collectively resolved to participate in the elections for 29 metropolitan municipalities, designating 10 candidates from the Good Party and 19 candidates from the CHP.
Furthermore, the candidacies for district municipalities were also divided among the alliance partners.
Moreover, the HDP and certain “left” factions that aligned themselves with it completely shifted their strategies to revolve around the axis of “defeating Erdoğan.” They opted not to field candidates in major cities where their chances of winning appeared slim. This decision essentially served as an indirect call to vote for the opposition candidate against the AKP/MHP. At times, this intention was explicitly stated. Ultimately, the opposition, built upon an anti-Erdoğan/AKP sentiment and aided by the attached “left” factions, emerged victorious in 10 Metropolitan Municipality Mayoralties under the leadership of the CHP.
Among the Metropolitan Municipalities secured by the CHP on March 31, 2019, were Istanbul and Ankara, both of which were previously held by the AKP. In the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayorship Election, the gap between the CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu and the AKP candidate Binali Yıldırım was a slight margin measured in the thousands. Following the AKP’s challenge with the argument of “Even if nothing happened, something must have happened!” the Metropolitan Municipality Mayorship Election was rerun on June 23, 2019. The margin expanded from 13,000 to 806,000. This marked a substantial triumph from the bourgeois opposition’s standpoint.
June 23, 2019 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Election Results
The bourgeois opposition construed these election results as the inception of the Erdoğan government’s decline. On June 24, Sözcü’s headline boldly stated “The Breakdown of One-Man Rule,” highlighting how barriers had been shattered, and “a relentless surge had begun.” Cumhuriyet proclaimed “the Collapse of the Party-State.” İmamoğlu framed the outcome as “A mandate for mobilization of personnel has been issued through the ballot box. Turkey is the objective!” Meanwhile, Kılıçdaroğlu asserted, “Mustafa Kemal and his comrades emerge victorious!” Meral Akşener noted, “Istanbul dealt a blow to the government.” According to the bourgeois opposition, this electoral outcome represented the people’s will, a rebuff of the Presidential system; AKP and Erdoğan had lost their popular backing. A new election was now seemingly inevitable! Meral Akşener even suggested that this election might morph into an early one in November 2019, urging for readiness. Conversely, the government-affiliated media on June 24 echoed messages like “The nation has spoken through the ballot box,” and “The election is concluded, now let’s focus on our tasks!”
Following June 2019, while all the government representatives vehemently declared, “The upcoming elections are scheduled for June 2023. Early elections are not on the agenda. Our focus is on our tasks,” the bourgeois opposition persistently advocated for early elections. After all, in the local elections, the people’s will had evidently “spoken out” against the government, solidifying the loss of its popular support. In the forthcoming election, this administration was destined to be toppled, and akin to the situation in Istanbul, “Everything will be better.” The second act concluded with this rallying cry from the CHP.
3.Act
After the triumph of the CHP candidate, backed by the entire bourgeois opposition, as well as the HDP and the left-wing parties and groups in alignment with it, in the re-run of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayoral Election on June 23, 2019, it became an indisputable truth for this coalition that the AKP/Erdoğan government’s days were limited. The alliance that echoed “Let Erdoğan go, no matter how!” had evolved into a coalition that acknowledged Erdoğan’s imminent departure following the first election, provided that unity remained unbroken and expanded. The new objective was to expedite an election to hasten his removal. Amidst the renewed discussions and calls for early elections, certain realities slipped from focus.
Chief among these was the misinterpretation of the Local Election results. To the bourgeois opposition, securing victory in 10 out of the 29 Metropolitan Municipalities seemed to designate them as the triumphant side, leading them to perceive themselves as the winners of the election. This narrative heralded the demise of the AKP and the imminent conclusion of the era of one-man rule. The election outcomes appeared to endorse this viewpoint. Indeed, the capture of the Istanbul and Ankara Metropolitan Mayoralties from the AKP through the election was an impressive feat. However, upon nationwide analysis of the election results, it became evident that the genuine winner on a national scale was the AKP as a political party and the People’s Alliance as a coalition.
On March 31, 2019, the AKP secured a nationwide vote percentage of 42.55% for the Metropolitan Municipality Mayoral elections, resulting in the acquisition of 742 mayoralties. The AKP’s victory spanned 54.76% of all mayoralties across the country. MHP, in coalition with AKP, collected 7.44%, resulting in 233 mayoralties. This constituted 17.20% of all mayoralties. The collective vote percentage for AKP+MHP in mayoral elections across Turkey stood at 49.99%, while the percentage of mayoralties secured reached 71.96%. Of course, a valid argument can be presented here — the majority of the population resides in metropolitan areas, where mayoralties hold greater significance compared to city, district, and town mayoralties, and thus, the number of mayoralties won isn’t the sole decisive factor.
Examining the outcomes of the municipal council membership elections, the most crucial statistics for a plausible comparison with general elections, the scenario unfolded as follows:
The AKP secured a nationwide vote percentage of 42.56%, whereas the MHP garnered a vote percentage of 7.46%. The combined tally of the two accounted for 50.02%, which proved sufficient to elect the president in the initial round! As for the CHP, its vote percentage reached 29.36%, while its ally, the Good Party, achieved 7.31%. The cumulative total of these two factions summed up to 36.67%.
Results of the General Local Administration Elections for Municipal Mayoralties on March 31, 2019
City Council Election Results
In conclusion, the outcomes of the March 31, 2019, General Local Administration Elections superficially indicated a decline in the AKP government’s influence. Statements like “the one-man regime has crumbled,” etc. amounted to interpretations that turned a blind eye to factual evidence and replaced reality with wishes. Nonetheless, the opposition had managed to persuade itself and its own circle that this interpretation held.
The second overlooked aspect was the steadfast pursuit of goals by the AKP and the alliance it forged, known as the “Presidential Government” according to the opposition. This alliance managed to solidify its supporters base, which still constitutes the majority of Turkish society, as it persisted in its objectives announced during the 2018 elections. Importantly, after the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, Erdoğan and the AKP effectively positioned themselves along what they termed a “domestic and national” line. This path represents the aspirations of the Turkish monopoly bourgeoisie, primarily the Sunni Muslim-Turkish conservative segment consolidating under the AKP, to shape Turkey into an independent imperialist force. This force seeks influence not only regionally but on a global scale. This stance diverges from the position that had categorized Turkey as a part of the Western imperialist bloc since the 1950s. It strives to carve out a distinct place for Turkey as an autonomous imperialist actor within the division of the world.
Certainly, the culturally secular, Western-oriented, self-defined “modern” segment of the Turkish monopoly bourgeoisie also envisions an imperialist Turkey. Its ambition is for Turkey to become a significant imperialist power on the world stage. However, this segment believes and argues that such a transformation can only occur in conjunction with Western imperialist “allies and friends,” as an integral part of that collective. From their perspective, Turkey cannot and should not evolve into an independent imperialist force detached from the West. For them, concepts like justice, equality, and human rights all find representation within the framework of Western democracy. The West epitomizes modernization and enlightenment, while the East is associated with backwardness and the darkness of the Middle Ages, among other things. According to this viewpoint, the AKP and Erdoğan are steering Turkey toward a regression to the Middle Ages, seeking to transform it into a Middle Eastern nation and dragging it into the quagmire of the Middle East.
Behind the opposition’s presidential candidate, Kılıçdaroğlu’s commitment to “reverse this policy 180 degrees” in foreign affairs lies these two distinct imperialization goals and strategies. Neither of these two strategies offers anything substantial to support or endorse for the workers and laborers of Northern Kurdistan and Turkey.
After the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, the AKP and Erdoğan undeniably refocused on the MHP as their primary political ally. Additionally, they mended relations with Kemalist factions within the state apparatus who had resisted the coup attempt, refrained from cooperating with the coup plotters, and played a role in its swift failure. The nationalism that Erdoğan had once belittled and “trampled underfoot” became a central tenet of his approach. Propaganda directed at the masses underscored “domestic and national” sentiments as a pivotal slogan. Within the framework of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the prominence of Turkish identity started to outweigh its previous stature. Conversely, the opposition was portrayed as extensions of foreign powers, branded as “foreigners among us.” It’s fair to acknowledge that they certainly contributed to earning this label! Kılıçdaroğlu’s visits to the US in search of “advisors,” pledges to reinstate individuals dismissed through Decree-Law due to alleged connections with the Gülen movement, and other akin actions were thoroughly exploited.
Once upon a time, Kemalism, which used to be the primary arsenal of the CHP, was not only appropriated by the MHP but also directly through the narrative that Erdoğan embodies the true essence of Mustafa Kemal in today’s context. At the very least, the monopoly on Kemalism/Atatürkism within the CHP and among the Western-oriented factions had been disrupted.
This was partially achieved due to Kılıçdaroğlu and his team’s realization that they couldn’t attain power without garnering support from a segment of AKP voters in Turkey. Gradually, they adopted AKP-esque policies and strategies to secure election victories, attracting those disenchanted with the AKP. The latest strategy, framed as “reconciliation,” estranged steadfast Kemalists and left-leaning secularists within the CHP’s base.
The third act essentially set the stage for the 2023 elections, where both sides introduced themselves and their adversaries. On one side stood the People’s Alliance, portraying themselves as “domestic and national” while labeling their rivals as “foreigners among us.” The central question revolved around whether the election concerned Turkey’s survival, heralding the “Turkish Century,” or determining rule by proxies of imperialist powers within our national boundaries.
On the opposing front, the Nation Alliance self-declared itself as the champion of “democracy, human rights, justice, law, and equity,” opposing the “Palace dictatorship of the One-Man Rule.” The election posed a decision between a Turkey that flourished within democratic alignment alongside the honorable democratic West, honoring human rights, versus a “One-Man dictatorship” that would plunge Turkey into the darkness of the Middle Ages. This election marked the “final turning point before the path to Afghanistan.” If Erdoğan remained in power, there could be no more elections.
A substantial portion of the “left” also contributed to the narrative of the Nation Alliance through their own discourse. For instance, according to their rhetoric, this election was akin to choosing between ”Switzerland or the Middle East” for Turkey’s future, as articulated by Selahattin Demirtaş.
The election results subsequently disclosed that, from the standpoint of the majority of voters, the nationalist rhetoric of the People’s Alliance held more sway compared to the Nation Alliance’s discourse of “safeguarding democracy against one-man dictatorship.”
This is where the abilities of the sellers and their credibility with the voters (buyers) come into play.
4.Act
There are deep-seated differences rooted in the structure of the two alliances, resulting in variations in skill and credibility, along with their accompanying pros and cons.
The People’s Alliance possesses leaders who are unquestionably embraced as leaders/chieftains/chiefs within their respective parties and communities. Erdoğan, in particular, is held in such high regard that he’s almost worshipped.
One of the leaders within the People’s Alliance is Erdoğan, a “sacred” figure whom a notable number of his cult’s followers are willing to revere to the point of considering themselves his “butt hair”. Some even believe him to be a “prophet” and a “blessed” leader, referred to as “Reis” (Chief). The other leader, Bahçeli, leads a fascist party with a cult that stands ready to “shoot as instructed and sacrifice as commanded.”
In broader society — encompassing a substantial segment of the secular-Westernist “modernist” faction — there exists a collection of cults dominated by the notion of a “savior leader.”
This bestows a notable advantage upon the People’s Alliance in the eyes of the masses, who seek a savior figure outside of themselves.
In the long run, “faithful” loyalty to the leader can prove to be a disadvantage for the organization, creating a substantial void when the leader is absent, particularly in such circumstances. However, within the context of an election or election campaign, it undeniably translates into a significant advantage in terms of credibility.
Furthermore, the People’s Alliance exhibits coherence and unity in terms of ambitions and objectives. Two leaders play a central role in articulating the core of these objectives, presenting a united front through a specific division of labor. For the 2023 elections, the People’s Alliance promptly introduced its presidential candidate: Erdoğan! He unveiled his foundational policy from the outset, emphasizing “domestic and national” principles. He portrayed himself as a champion of “nationalism” and guardian of “national and religous values,” positioning himself as a defender of the “endangered Turkish Republic.” He positioned his rivals against these principles in the eyes of the voters, endeavoring to link all forms of opposition to terrorism and label them as “terrorists.” He sought to antagonize them as the “foreigners among us.”
These declarations were accompanied by an array of “national grand projects” that were announced in succession, gradually becoming a reality. As the election drew near, there was a surge in inaugurations and the dissemination of “good news.” Along the path of reducing energy reliance on foreign sources, various initiatives emerged, such as the “Black Sea Gas,” “Gabar Oil,” and endeavors for self-sufficiency in the defense industry like “drones, armed drones, and national combat aircraft.” Investments and incentives were directed towards the production of high-tech, high-value-added products. Space technology development efforts were initiated, the introduction of the “domestic car” TOGG was undertaken, and there were ambitious infrastructure investments encompassing highways, High-Speed Trains, Bosphorus tunnels, and more. Furthermore, TOKİ structures built to enable low-income individuals to acquire housing, direct support to farmers, and much more.
Faced with these developments, a portion of the bourgeois opposition and some segments of the “left” who follow their lead either engage in denial and belittlement of the “achievements” [“They’re selling their own gas calling it Black Sea Gas!” (Can Ataklı); “Drones, armed drones. What are those? Just regular toy drones.” (Prof. Dr. Emre Kongar); “Domestic car? Show us the factory for that, then!” (Kılıçdaroğlu)], or they resist by stating “We won’t allow them” in a stance of opposition [“Highways and bridges won’t be built; these are means to enrich the Gang of Five” (Merdan Yanardağ)]. Remember the Third Bridge, Istanbul Airport, Marmaray, Çanakkale Bridge, Izmir Highway, and the Bosphorus tunnel; None of these were expected to be constructed! This unhealthy interpretation of “opposition,” as articulated in the words of Engin Altay, Deputy Chairman of the CHP Parliamentary Group in the 27th term, during a speech in the parliament, “Even if this government does the most right thing in the world, we have no intention of applauding this government. Our duty, my friend, is what our people have entrusted to us,” provided ample material for the discourse of the People’s Alliance, such as “They oppose anything positive happening in Turkey; they are adversaries of Turkey; they are foreigners within us,” and more. Nevertheless, in the end, the People’s Alliance government accomplished a significant portion of what was said “We won’t allow them.” In terms of skill and credibility, the People’s Alliance entered the elections with an advantage.
In contrast to the Cumhur Alliance, the Nation Alliance has leaders whose leadership is questioned within their own parties.
Kılıçdaroğlu assumed the leadership of the CHP amid a tape conspiracy, and his most notable characteristic is his bureaucratic background, often emphasizing that he has not violated anyone’s rights. His primary political achievement is his ability to maintain party leadership despite facing defeat in multiple elections. During the previous election cycle, he managed to bring together diverse factions that wouldn’t typically align in politics, convening around the table of six and successfully emerging as the candidate of the united front. However, the true driving force behind this success is ultimately not Kılıçdaroğlu, but rather the growing dissatisfaction with Erdoğan within a significant portion of society and the negotiations that took place at the coalition table.
Meral Akşener’s political history includes affiliations with countless right-wing and fascist parties. During the 90s, when she served as the Minister of Interior, it marked one of the darkest periods in the history of Northern Kurdistan-Turkey due to a wave of “unidentified” fascist murders. During that time, around 17,000 citizens faced an unknown fate. After traversing through several parties, her journey ultimately led to the MHP. Following an unsuccessful bid for the leadership of the MHP against Bahçeli, she established her own party, claiming to “fill the void in the center-right.” Even within her own cult, her leadership is questioned.
Babacan, who held ministerial positions for an extended period during AKP governments and was dubbed “Bebecan” by the opposition during his ministerial tenure, is anything but a charismatic leader.
Davutoğlu, who initially served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and subsequently as the Prime Minister, even swearing loyalty to Erdoğan after being removed from the premiership, has proven incapable of detaching millions from the AKP. His confidence and self-praise appear to be inversely proportional to his “credibility.”
We remember Karamollaoğlu, the leader of the Felicity Party, as the Mayor of Sivas during the Madımak massacre. He is a politician who even struggles to make his voice heard within his small cult.
Uysal, the leader of the one-in-a-thousand-votes party, is a name that resonated within the DP cult, and among individuals professionally involved in politics, others learned his name through the table of six. However, let’s give credit where it’s due: Among the leaders of the table of six parties, he is the most skillful when it comes to impromptu speeches and empty agitation.
5.Act
Contrasting with the unified voice of the People’s Alliance, the Nation Alliance represented a diverse range of voices, reflecting various perspectives. While this coalition collectively asserted that its fundamental aim was to shift from the current single-man rule to a “strengthened parliamentary democratic regime,” those who understood that achieving this required a constitutional change from the presidential to the parliamentary system found this assertion lacking in credibility. From the very beginning, those astute in reading politics and society could discern that both alliances obtaining the parliamentary majority for constitutional amendments was extremely difficult, if not nearly impossible.
In essence, this alliance had a singular purpose: The removal of Erdogan from the presidency. Its goal was to put an end to the AKP’s 21-year rule.
Eventually, two more parties joined the initial four that had formed the Nation Alliance. DEVA, founded by Babacan, and “Future Party,” established by Davutoğlu, both of which consisted of former AKP members. With this, a total of six parties united to democratically oust Erdoğan. This gave rise to the “table of six.”
The collective assessment at the table was as follows: The people were grappling with a severe economic crisis. Both the AKP and MHP bases expressed discontent due to the high cost of living. Unemployment was rampant. The Turkish currency was continuously losing value, and even according to official figures, inflation had spiked to levels nearing 80%, particularly affecting those with lower incomes. The population was in turmoil. The cry of “the nation is hungry and starving” reverberated. In contrast, the “Palace” was living luxuriously. The government in the palace had become utterly disconnected from the people. As Demirel once said, “An empty pot will bring down the government.” The AKP-led government had little chance of rectifying this situation. By managing the crisis through measures, at least until the elections, the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank had been depleted, and the government was drowning in red ink. “This government had degraded Turkey to begging for foreign currency from loan sharks.” Contrary to its assertions, it wasn’t promoting domestic or nationalistic efforts, but rather collaborationism. The populace was growing poorer day by day; “people couldn’t afford to bring bread home,” and “children were going to bed hungry.” The public’s response to these conditions would inevitably be reflected at the ballot box. Moreover, due to Erdoğan’s “reckless politics” on the global stage, he had become isolated. The US administration and Western governments were openly endorsing the opposition against Erdogan. After 21 years in power, the prospect of removing Erdogan from office through elections was truly plausible. The March 2019 Local Elections and the June 23, 2019 rerun of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayoral Election had already provided substantial data on how to achieve this: When all the bourgeois opposition parties united behind a common candidate, Erdoğan would unquestionably face defeat. Even combining the votes of all these parties wouldn’t be sufficient to overcome Erdoğan without including the votes of the HDP. Nevertheless, once the table of six settled on a shared candidate, the HDP had no alternative but to support the candidate chosen by them! HDP’s election strategy had been clear from the outset, explicitly aimed at “defeating Erdoğan.” In this sense, securing HDP’s support was a straightforward matter. Separate negotiations weren’t necessary. The same applied to other bourgeois parties that shared the core objective of toppling Erdoğan. Whether they were part of the table or not, eventually they would have to back the strongest candidate against Erdoğan. Such was the collective assessment of the Nation Alliance.
However, within this alliance, each partner had its own calculations, often conflicting with those of their counterparts.
This became evident when the Nation Alliance expanded its composition to include the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) and the Future Party. Critical matters such as the conduct of their meetings, the choice of venue, agenda setting, and seating arrangements need to be addressed. Eventually, a resolution was reached: Decision-making meetings would exclusively involve the 6 party leaders. Decisions would be reached not solely through a majority vote but by consensus among these leaders. The meetings would rotate among the headquarters of all alliance parties, with the hosting party’s president presiding over each gathering and determining the agenda. Recognizing the equality of all parties, the meetings would be conducted around a roundtable. And so it was done.
The Nation Alliance was an electoral coalition comprising bourgeois opposition forces united with the shared goal of ousting Erdogan. A central concern the alliance faced was how cooperation would function during the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Since the presidency wielded significant influence within the existing system, selecting the alliance’s candidate was of the utmost importance. While the People’s Alliance had already disclosed its presidential candidate, they continually pressed the Nation Alliance to reveal its candidate. However, attempting to navigate and resolve this issue risked early cracks in the alliance due to the differing calculations of the alliance partners. While delaying addressing the core matter was advantageous to the alliance partners, this strategy disadvantaged the Nation Alliance in the ongoing election campaign that the People’s Alliance had already launched. Nonetheless, research indicated that regardless of who opposed Erdoğan, “anyone standing against Erdoğan will prevail,” thus reducing the urgency to swiftly determine and announce the candidate. Despite Erdoğan and Bahçeli repeatedly asserting that the election would take place on schedule, representatives of the Nation Alliance sidestepped the question “Who is your candidate?” by stating that the election date had yet to be finalized and they would reveal their candidate the day after the election date was announced.
The specific candidate of the Nation Alliance wasn’t important; however, one certainty prevailed: “The Nation Alliance candidate would become the 13th President of the Republic.” This became especially evident after a major earthquake struck in February, claiming the lives of over 50,000 people. The helplessness of the Erdoğan administration in the face of the earthquake had been witnessed and experienced by the people. The Erdoğan administration seemed buried under the debris of the disaster.
Ultimately, Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy—following a series of maneuvers and power plays among the alliance partners, constituting another act in this political theater—was announced merely seven weeks before the impending elections. On one side, there was a fervent presidential campaign employing the full resources of the state. On the other side, the candidate who secured his own candidacy just 50 days before the election embarked on a 50-day campaign. Under these circumstances, if this candidate managed to attain 48% of the vote in the second round, it could be deemed a form of success. However, the true architect of this achievement wasn’t the Nation Alliance or its candidate, but rather the profound societal division concerning the economy and Erdoğan. Indeed, in the conditions of May 2023, as Eren Erdem expressed, even an “Empty Cola Can” could have garnered 48% of the vote! But only that much. This is because within the divided sentiments towards Erdoğan in society, there is more admiration for him than antagonism. Among the majority of voters, the narrative of the “Turkish Century” grounded in “domestic and national” sentiment resonates more powerfully than the discourse centered on transitioning to a “strengthened parliamentary system” and “democratization.” Were the economic circumstances of the people more favorable, the vote for the “Empty Cola Can” might be slightly lower, while Erdoğan’s vote could be slightly higher. Nonetheless, the distinction between the two wouldn’t be significantly substantial.
6.Act
The most significant scene of this act commences with the powerful speech delivered by the leading female actress of the theater, Meral Akşener, during the Executive Board Meeting of the Good Party on March 3rd:
“The Good Party finds itself ensnared and coerced. However, we will not yield. The spokesperson for contrived politics motivated by personal gain will not prevail, no matter how determined they may be.
Our objection remains unwavering, regardless of who stands before us. Just as we have consistently done, we stand firm.
We stand against those who proclaim, ‘Even if I hang my jacket, they will nominate.’
We have come this far by rejecting corrupt deals. We have risen above our customary defeats. Our political focus has revolved around our people, taking us to every corner of our homeland. We listened attentively to our people’s grievances, complaints, and aspirations. Just as we diligently noted these issues and conveyed them to the government, we tirelessly worked to fulfill the expectations of the opposition. As the Good Party, driven by our belief in democracy, we have always considered debating problems and solutions under the illumination of collective wisdom as an intellectual imperative.
In light of the needs of our people and our homeland, we took a momentous stride alongside five other political parties. We found consensus on numerous critical matters that address our shared concerns for Turkey and offer potential solutions. These encompass a fortified parliamentary system, constitutional reforms, and various other pivotal subjects related to tackling our shared challenges and devising solutions.
Yesterday, we finally deliberated on the joint presidential candidate. Five political parties endorsed Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy, putting forward a single name. For over three years, we’ve expressed our views regarding the candidacy of two individuals whose names resonated in the streets, garnered immense public support, and emerged victorious in opinion polls. These two individuals are Mr. Mansur Yavaş and Mr. Ekrem İmamoğlu. Furthermore, to ensure a fair candidate selection process, we suggested that each political party independently determine the joint presidential candidate using the objective methodology of research companies. Regrettably, our suggestions were outright rejected by the stakeholders at the table. During the final meeting, a ‘consensus’ was reached, prioritizing personal ambitions over the well-being of Turkey. Fabrications were embraced to serve personal agendas, and petty interests that had grown defeat after defeat were favored. The establishment of the Good Party was not meant for such purposes.
We’ve made sacrifices at times, endured insults, and held firm. We faced backlash but remained steadfast. We tirelessly explained our positions, never growing weary or giving in.
The table of six has now lost its ability to represent the people’s will in its decisions. This platform, once a forum for collective wisdom to discuss potential candidates, has transformed into a notary desk focused on validating a single candidate.
We’ve appended our valuable signatures, and regardless of the outcome, we stand by them. However, we will not participate in a table of gamble or become part of a notary desk. We refuse to place the fate of 85 million people in the hands of a few individuals. We will not extinguish the hope of our people’s victory.
I extend a call to Mr. İmamoğlu and Mr. Yavaş. Despite facing false accusations, you’ve maintained your integrity. You’ve worked diligently and fulfilled your duties excellently, overcoming obstacles. At this pivotal juncture, the people are summoning you to serve.”
During yesterday’s Table of Six meeting, the topic of candidacy was finally addressed. Over the term, the issue of a “deferred” candidacy was consistently emphasized, underscoring the concept of a “candidate yet to be chosen.” Meral Akşener took a stance against Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy without directly mentioning his name. She asserted that she wouldn’t be a candidate herself but expressed her aspiration to become the prime minister in a parliamentary system.
Akşener proposed the idea of having a candidate from outside the table, specifically a mayor from either Istanbul or Ankara who is affiliated with the CHP (Republican People’s Party). However, this proposition was ultimately rejected. The leaders of the other five parties collectively maintained their support for Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy. It appears that Kılıçdaroğlu had already “convinced” the leaders of the four smaller parties, whose combined votes might raise doubts about reaching the 5% threshold, regarding his candidacy, before the meeting.
During the first discussion of candidacy, Meral Akşener encountered a united front of five leaders opposing her. At this juncture, discussions took a turn, leading to “fabrications being embraced to serve personal agendas”, and the dissolution of the metaphorical “gambling table” and “notary table.” In this act, it’s important to clarify that Kılıçdaroğlu is not the candidate representing the Good Party!
Akşener is urging the two CHP mayors she refers to as “our presidents” (naturally, on behalf of the Nation) to declare their candidacies. The racist Victory Party had previously extended the same offer to one of them, Yavaş! Now, the decision rests with these mayors. If either of them steps forward and proclaims, “I am a candidate on behalf of our country and its people,” they will become the official candidate of the Good Party.
The situation appears to be a mess for the bourgeois opposition, as they can only win through a united candidate with the backing of the HDP (and, naturally, the “Left” trailing behind it). On the Erdoğan front, success seems like a “piece of cake.” Either the 5-party block that initially agreed on Kılıçdaroğlu’s nomination will backtrack, abandoning their insistence on his candidacy and opting for a “compromise” that aligns with the Good Party’s proposal, or Akşener will eventually be ”persuaded” to return to the negotiating table.
The aftermath consists of intense discussions and a flurry of criticism against Meral Akşener, branding her a “traitor” on various anti-social media platforms. The democracy champion of the table of six coalition suddenly turns into a mess, referred to as “Flush it Down. Let it go!” (a well-known and sophisticated statement from our intellectual and artist, Fazıl Say, as seen in his highly “liked” Twitter post).
Amidst this fervent discussion, a solution is devised that leads Meral Akşener, who previously stormed out from the table of “gambling” and “dirty bargaining,” to return to the same table with comparatively less resistance just three days later. Following the conclusive meeting held at the Felicity Party headquarters, attended by the leaders of all six parties, where uncertainty lingered until an hour before regarding Meral Akşener’s participation, Karamollaoğlu addresses the enthusiastic crowd gathered in front of the party building alongside a cohort of media personnel. He then delivers the “good news” to the gathered audience.
“As the leaders of the political parties constituting the Nation Alliance, we hereby announce that our collective presidential candidate for the 28th Term Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) elections and the 13th Presidential elections, scheduled for the year 2023, is Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.
May this decision bring prosperity to our country and our nation!”
Furthermore, a “12-point agreement text” has been shared with the media. According to this text:
The overarching aim is to establish a “Strengthened Parliamentary System.”
Nonetheless, there will be a designated “Transition Period” for the implementation of this new system.
“Throughout this Transition Period, the leaders of the political parties forming the Nation Alliance will assume the roles of Vice Presidents to the President.”
“The allocation of ministries will be determined in proportion to the number of parliamentary deputies elected from the political parties that constitute the Nation Alliance during general elections.”
“Each of the parties in the alliance will be represented in the cabinet by at least one minister.”
“The appointment and removal of ministers will be carried out by the President in consultation and agreement with the respective political party leader.”
“Throughout the Transition Period, the President will exercise executive authority and responsibilities based on participation, consultation, and consensus principles.”
“The delegation of authority and responsibilities to the Presidential Cabinet (comprising Vice Presidents and Ministers) will be outlined in a presidential decree issued within the boundaries of the constitution and legal regulations.”
“Decisions about the renewal of presidential elections, the proclamation of a state of emergency, policies concerning national security, Presidential Decisions, Decrees, and general regulatory measures, as well as significant appointments, will be reached through consensus among the leaders of the parties within the Nation Alliance.”
“After the completion of the transition to the strengthened parliamentary system, any political party affiliation of the current President, if applicable, will terminate.”
“After the full implementation of the Strengthened Parliamentary System, the 13th Presidential term and the tenure of the Grand National Assembly will conclude without the necessity for a new election.”
“At a suitable juncture determined by the President and with specific duties assigned, the Mayors of the Istanbul and Ankara Metropolitan Municipalities will be appointed as Vice Presidents.”
Hence, a President accompanied by five party leaders will collectively act as a council of seven Vice Presidents! Vital decisions will be reached through mutual agreement among these party leaders. The Presidential Cabinet, composed of these seven Vice Presidents, will encompass at least one minister from each party. Additional ministers will be selected by the President, subject to a collective decision made by the party leaders. Interestingly, Kılıçdaroğlu, who had previously declared, “The President should not have party affiliations; I will sever ties with the party on the day of my election,” will postpone this matter of severing ties until “after the completion of the transition to the strengthened parliamentary system.”
Already in turbulence because of the “who will be the presidential candidate” dilemma and united by the common goal of “Erdoğan should go,” the framework, predominantly structured around negotiations for cabinet ministers, seems to unify these aspects and it becomes clear that as soon as the shared adversary exits the stage, they will eat each other alive. The consensus document not only highlights the disputes existing among the parties themselves but also foreshadows the imminent internal clashes within each individual party.
The Nation Alliance has entered the final 50 days of the election campaign with a candidate whom the second-largest party within the alliance, the Good Party, does not regard as the “candidate who shall win.”
7.Act
The journey for the Nation Alliance has now concluded. With the assurance that the candidate at the table will indeed assume the role of the 13th President, Kılıçdaroğlu is now being referred to as “Our President” or “Mr. President.” Throughout the upcoming rallies and events, Kılıçdaroğlu will be introduced, addressed, and speak as the “13th President.” The leaders of the other five parties within the Nation Alliance, along with İmamoğlu and Yavaş, are also being recognized as “Vice Presidents.”
Credit where credit’s due: All members of the Nation Alliance have been tirelessly working in the final fifty days. Although the HDP and other elements affiliated with the “left” may exhibit a degree of reluctance initially, they ultimately extended their support to Kılıçdaroğlu’s campaign for the presidential election. Some minor issues surfaced during the campaign leading up to May 14th.
One of these concerns revolves around whether the Nation Alliance’s presidential candidate, Kılıçdaroğlu, will visit the HDP, which isn’t a member of the Alliance. This poses a notable challenge to the Good Party’s stance of “We won’t be where the HDP is.” The matter is “resolved” by clarifying that the visit will occur not in his capacity as the Nation Alliance’s presidential candidate but rather as the leader of the CHP and by ensuring that it takes place within the parliamentary group hall of the Grand National Assembly!
Another concern revolves around position with regards to Muharrem İnce’s the Homeland Party. Following the ‘table crisis’ within the Nation Alliance, Muharrem İnce’s party appears to have gained significant momentum in public opinion polls, exceeding 5%. It now holds a position that cannot be disregarded. Muharrem İnce has garnered considerable attention throughout his election campaign. The Homeland Party has also emerged as one of the most prominent bourgeois parties on social media. Muharrem İnce asserts that he will stand as the presidential candidate and advance to the second round. (Certainly, why not? Similar to the assertion that Kılıçdaroğlu will secure a 60% victory in the first round, this statement can also be put forward.) He contends that if he fails to proceed to the second round, he will naturally throw his support behind the candidate challenging Erdoğan in the second round. However, he expects the same commitment from Kılıçdaroğlu in return. It is widely recognized that Muharrem İnce has minimal chances of making it to the second round. Yet, according to the strategists of the Nation Alliance, his presence in the first round could potentially lead to a runoff, postponing the victory that could be achieved in the initial round.
Experiencing discomfort due to exclusion from the inner circle, being held responsible for the previous electoral defeat, and leaders of small parties being offered the role of “vice president,” assigned ministerial positions in the government, Muharrem İnce’s candidacy in the first round serves as a form of retaliation and a declaration of “I’m here” in the impending power struggle within the CHP after Kılıçdaroğlu. Kılıçdaroğlu pays a visit to Muharrem İnce at the headquarters of the Homeland Party. Certainly, everyone possesses the right to contend for the presidency. Nevertheless, it would be preferable if Muharrem İnce were to withdraw his candidacy. After the meeting with Kılıçdaroğlu, Muharrem İnce announced that he won’t step back. He manages to gather the required one hundred thousand signatures and submits his application for candidacy.
Another contender apart from Muharrem İnce is Sinan Oğan from the Racist Victory Party. He also amasses the necessary one hundred thousand endorsements to qualify as a candidate. The Nation Alliance does not voice objections to his candidacy. This is due to the calculation that his votes will primarily stem from disenchanted MHP and AKP supporters, thereby reducing Erdoğan’s vote share. The Supreme Election Council discloses that the first round of the presidential election will feature four candidates. The sequence of candidates on the ballot paper is revealed. Ballots are printed. Muharrem İnce does not withdraw his candidacy. From this juncture onward, an extensive online campaign to defame Muharrem İnce ensues. He is labeled a traitor and a puppet of the palace. Such accusations are not new, as they have existed for some time. Now he is tasked with extending the election to a second round, and so forth. Consequently, we are once again confronted with and exposed to the true essence of our “proponents of democracy”. Initially, Muharrem İnce resisted. However, when the smear campaign goes so far as to depict him as the lead actor in an explicit film, he gives up! Just three days before the election, he declared his withdrawal from the presidential candidacy, stating, “This is so they won’t have any excuses when they lose.” During the parliamentary elections, he encourages individuals to cast their votes for the Homeland Party, asserting, “This parliament must also include Kemalists.”
This is how the first round of the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections will unfold. We are aware of the outcomes.
8.Act
The most tragic figures in the May 14–28 election spectacle are, regrettably, the “leftists” who fail to grasp the reality that these elections constitute a clash between the two factions of the ruling class struggling for power. They held the belief that they would determine the election’s outcome and aligned themselves with the opposition wing of the bourgeoisie.
Foremost among these is the HDP, which has centered its election strategy around “making Erdoğan lose.” This approach hinges on viewing the fascism in North Kurdistan and Turkey as synonymous with the “Palace Government” of Erdoğan/AKP/MHP. However, there is a failure to comprehend that fascism represents the governing form of the bourgeois state in North Kurdistan and Turkey. The prevailing state’s nature would persist even if another bourgeois party were to assume power.
They perceive all adversaries of the “Palace Government” as temporary allies in the struggle against fascism, labeling them as “forces of democracy.”
When seen through this perspective, it becomes inevitable for the entire bourgeois opposition to relentlessly work towards entering the election with the sole candidate that the “left” would “elect” against Erdoğan, rather than competing with their own candidate.
This “left” has convinced itself, to a degree comparable with the elements of the Nation Alliance, that the election can be secured in the first round with the “right candidate.” By “right candidate,” they do not refer to their own candidates but rather someone even the bourgeoisie could endorse. Within this context, several representatives of the HDP have expressed reservations about two potential candidates. They remarked, “We won’t accept Meral Akşener” (Meral Akşener had already stated she wouldn’t run), and “We won’t accept Mansur Yavaş either” (Mansur Yavaş also indicated he wouldn’t run because the CHP chairman already runs). In reality, they said nothing important. When the premise is rooted in conceding to Erdoğan’s victory, if the scenario had been, “Our candidate is Akşener” or “It’s Yavaş,” the HDP and its affiliated groups would have readily rallied behind and supported them!
Regrettably, we observe that in these deliberations, the fallacy of such an approach was laid out in its entirety, along with all its rationale. It was underscored that if the “left” within North Kurdistan-Turkey seeks to establish itself as a credible alternative over the long term, it must detach itself from the politics of the lesser evil, emerge as a distinct entity independent of the bourgeoisie, and overtly present itself with its revolutionary agenda. However, the “left” chose to turn a deaf ear to these points. Ultimately, they became subservient to a specific clique in the bourgeoisie’s power struggle!
A few illustrative statements require no additional elaboration:
Demirtaş’s tweet ahead of May 14 read:
“Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu, may God guide your path as the 13th President of Turkey! I wholeheartedly believe that you will unify and bring an end to divisions, foster social harmony, and steer Turkey towards prosperity and serenity. My vote goes to you, Mr. #PresidentKılıçdaroğlu.”
The Left Party’s call to Muharrem İnce before May 14:
“This election presents an opportunity to break free from these adversities. If the collective will of the opposition rallies around a candidate, there’s no reason for us not to succeed. Therefore, to transform the current regime, we extend our call to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in the presidential election; and if you find his oppositional program insufficient, we urge you to cast your vote for the Left Party in the parliamentary elections.
In a situation where the present government is instigating chaos out of fear of losing, securing victory in the first round holds paramount importance. Being responsible for the chaotic atmosphere that could ensue in the second round is a historical misjudgment.
For Mr. İnce, our message is straightforward. Do not become entangled in the detrimental actions of the reigning regime! Do not contribute to the 15 days of turmoil and distress that would follow if the election extends to the second round!”
From the declaration of the Green Left Party, a component of the “Labor and Freedom Alliance” formed by the HDP for the elections:
“As the third-largest party in parliament, our determination to ensure the regime we prevented from prevailing in the first round faces defeat in the second round remains steadfast. In the upcoming eleven days, we will persist on our path, fueled by the fighting spirit of our people that gives us strength and purpose, and we will undoubtedly emerge victorious. In the forthcoming days, our organized structures, our constituents, our alliances, and above all, our people, will demonstrate their resolute response, at the ballot box, without taking a step back, to this regime that undermines justice, peace, and freedom.”
(…)
All our peoples, organizations, and allies within the country and abroad must go to the polls in the second round without postponing the arduous struggle against fascism until after the elections, and deliver the decisive blow. In response to the valuable criticism from our people, our most significant self-criticism will be to defeat the one-man regime. We will navigate through the impending critical phase with determination and unwavering effort. Armed with the belief of triumph, we have resolved to bolster our endeavors starting today.”
Reaction from TİP Chairman Erkan Baş to Muharrem İnce:
“There exists a desire deep within society, embedded in the hearts of citizens, to promptly remove this government from power. If a citizen had the opportunity to accomplish this 15 days before, why would they choose to wait another 15 days? They are eager to rid themselves of it without delay. This is why I firmly believe that the election is highly likely to conclude in the first round. Can a politician even posit the idea of ‘going to the second round’? Why should winning in the first round not be feasible? How could my entire purpose be deferring the election to a second round? Here lies a confession. Who do you truly serve? Hence, I know that the determination of the people to witness this process and swiftly oust the palace regime will find expression at the ballot box.”
And PKK
Cemil Bayık (ANF — Early May)
“Hence, this election will serve as a litmus test for whether power transitions occur through elections in Turkey. The importance of this lies in what it signifies for the democratic forces. If these democratic forces stand firm and prevent the AKP-MHP government from regaining authority, it will mark a significant milestone in Turkish politics.”
“The Kurdish population and the democratic factions within Turkey have driven the AKP-MHP fascist regime to the verge of collapse via their enduring struggles, albeit at a great cost. Should unwavering determination persist, and if the integrity of the election ballots is upheld, the downfall of this government is certain.”
Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Executive Council member Sabri Ok from his interview broadcast on Stêrk TV:
“Everyone is saying that this election stands apart and is distinct from its predecessors. It might even be recognized as the most pivotal election in the 100-year history of the Turkish Republic. Such an utterly critical election. What makes this election so momentous? The reach of AKP-MHP fascism touches everyone but themselves. Consequently, all those who do not align with the AKP-MHP are united against them. Observe that during World War II, a similar scenario played out. The Soviets, America, and Europe united to form a democratic resistance front against the fascism of Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. Despite their differing factions, they forged a common front against a shared threat. This parallel applies to Turkey today. Except for Erdoğan and Bahçeli’s self-interests, they stand in opposition to everything and everyone. At times, they suggest that the PKK and the Good Party are in alignment. Their proclaimed stance is against fascism. Such a unified attitude wouldn’t emerge if they weren’t unequivocal fascists themselves. This is the magnitude of AKP-MHP fascism.
The prevailing subject of these elections revolves around whether democratic methods can bring an end to this government. Democratic politics, politicians, and other parties seek outcomes from the election, aspiring to terminate this fascism and revert to a parliamentary system. I should clarify that a parliamentary system doesn’t automatically guarantee a wholly democratic setup. Although content is of significance, what presently matters most is the demise of this fascism. This is why the Nation Alliance and the Labor and Democracy Alliance have coalesced for these elections. The undeniable reality is that the 20-year dominion of AKP fascism will crumble. The collapse of AKP-MHP fascism will inaugurate a fresh phase in Turkey and Kurdistan. Why? Because there have been numerous endeavors. They have suppressed the Kurdish people, the PKK, democratic factions, and institutions through oppression, unethical methods, and inhuman ways. Nonetheless, fascism has been defeated. The implication is that those ascending to power should not replicate the same errors. The circumstances are ripe for society and politics to undergo democratization and for issues to be resolved. If AKP-MHP fascism falls in these elections, it will serve as a milestone for all—there will preceding the elections (PE) and following the elections (FE). This is the immense importance these elections carry.”
Their shared standpoint is that fascism equals Erdoğan/AKP/MHP and their downfall is imminent. The elections will serve as a pathway to democracy. In conclusion: Thus, our vote is cast for Kılıçdaroğlu!
9.Final Act
The election results brought about a great disappointment for the masses, who had been convinced, and also convinced themselves, that the end of the Erdoğan government was inevitable through this election. And for those who accepted the defeat, the reactions from a certain part of the semi-intellectuals, who consider themselves superior after every election loss, were repeated:
These results showed how widespread ignorance was.
It was no longer possible to live in this country. One should have packed up and left.
This nation could never become civilized.
On the night when the election results went public, as written in a tweet:
“Those who couldn’t afford onions… Those who couldn’t get medical treatment… Those who washed their heads with dish soap… Those who couldn’t fill their bags at the market… Those who have no equality in opportunity… Those who couldn’t find justice in the courts… Now they should fend for themselves.” It wasn’t worth the effort for them! Etc.
However, for some, there was no true defeat at all. The election had been rigged by the tactics employed during the election process and the inadequate safeguarding of the ballot boxes. There was no room for a feeling of demoralization. Take, for example, the words of Merdan Yanardağ on May 21st:
“It’s nearly certain that the allegations regarding election fraud—that this fraud occurred even before the votes entered the ballot boxes—hold truth.
(…)
Except for individuals directly under the palace’s control, almost all public opinion polls indicated Kılıçdaroğlu’s lead. Moreover, the ordinary rhythm of life and the sentiments of the streets and squares were echoing the same indication. The political momentum had shifted towards the opposition. Therefore, everything and everyone could not have misled us. However, as expected and acknowledged—before and after the election—ensuring complete election security remained insufficient, and ballot boxes could not be adequately guarded. This is the primary reality that must be acknowledged.
(…)
One should not forget that there is no defeat for the opposition. This notion should remain steadfast. On the contrary, it is a defeat for the political Islamist government and the Islamo-fascist coalition. Yet, due to the failure to promptly recognize this situation and launch an effective counter-response, as previously noted, the moral advantage was relinquished to the reactionary-fascist alliance. This constitutes the most substantial loss.”
There existed a segment for whom this election wasn’t regarded as a genuine election; they comforted themselves by asserting that, on one side, the entirety of the state’s resources had been employed for the campaign and the opposition had not competed in equal conditions. Certainly, what was voiced held truth, yet this was evident from the outset. Interestingly, those who proclaimed a certain first-round victory with a 60% margin were fully aware of this fact.
For some, the indisputable reality stood thus: Erdoğan and the AKP secured their triumph through overseas votes and the votes of Syrian (Arab!) immigrants who had been conferred Turkish citizenship. This oft-repeated argument assumed a place in the realm of urban legends when it was realized that even if the entirety of valid votes cast abroad were combined with the votes of all eligible Syrian immigrants, and it was canceled or even added to Kılıçdaroğlu’s tally, the election outcome would remain unchanged due to the inherent mathematical truth.
From Kılıçdaroğlu’s perspective, Erdoğan was already fraudulent, having achieved victory through deceit. His election triumph was aided by a manipulated tape. Individuals who fabricate counterfeit recordings are deemed fraudsters. A fraudster could not legitimately hold the presidency. Thus, Erdoğan was not the president. While he may have ascended politically to the presidency, he did not possess the moral standing of a president. For CHP and Kılıçdaroğlu, there was no defeat, “failure,” and so forth. On the contrary, CHP garnered its highest-ever vote count in history! We witnessed these “evaluations” that had little connection to reality with amazement.
Although Kılıçdaroğlu seemed considerably “reconciling” during the election period, he introduced a new dimension to his prior rhetoric about those who cast their votes for Erdoğan and the AKP, previously expressed in past elections, when interpreting the election results. While analyzing the outcomes on Sözcü TV in June, Kılıçdaroğlu stated the following:
“…We conducted an analysis to identify where we went wrong. When addressing the public, it’s crucial to base our statements on data. Ballot boxes numbered 1-2-3 were situated in places like villages, towns, and small municipalities. In these regions, I received 3,580,115 votes, while Erdoğan received 6,100,355 votes.
In urban centers and districts with 3 or more ballot boxes, Kılıçdaroğlu garnered 51% of the votes, with Erdoğan receiving 49%. This indicates that the CHP (Republican People’s Party) acknowledges its inability to make the required impact in rural areas and locations with ballot boxes numbered 1-2-3. The difference stems from these specific ballot boxes. The urban population overwhelmingly sided with democracy. Few other parties have made comparable preparations to the extent that the CHP has.
I will never agree to view the outcome as a substantial defeat, and I don’t believe it’s appropriate for you to view it that way either. While it’s true we didn’t emerge as the winners, characterizing it as a major loss to the public is not acceptable.
…It’s undeniable that we didn’t secure victory. We also delved into the reasons why rural residents were less influenced by the economic downturn. The explanation is relatively straightforward: when you’re given 500 liras a month, there are limited spending options, especially in a village where there might not be places to spend money. Residing in an earthquake-prone zone is also a matter of personal choice. Resources and funds have been allocated…”
Indeed, the primary reason for the electoral loss lies in the distribution of funds. Were it not for the handouts from food vendors, coal suppliers, and now the inluence of villagers enticed by 500 liras, and if the elections exclusively took place in major cities, the CHP would likely secure an easy victory. In the end, the CHP is committed to democracy, and “all urban residents voted in favor of democracy.”
Following the election’s conclusion, the two major factions within the National Alliance encountered internal upheaval. In contrast, the four smaller coalition partners found contentment. If these four coalesced to ally, their combined efforts wouldn’t surpass the 7% threshold, implying the SP+DEVA+Gelecek+DP coalition wouldn’t have the opportunity to gain even a single parliamentary seat. However, by participating in the election on the CHP’s lists, they collectively secured a total of 39 seats in the parliament. Hence, each of them now holds representation in the Grand National Assembly with their respective parties. “MPs earned through honest means,” as Babacan phrased it. Initially, the Felicity/Future Party aimed to establish a group alongside the DEVA Party. In response to DEVA’s decline, they united under the banner of the Felicity Party.
Within the CHP and Good Party, responsibility for the defeat was attributed to “the president” and the leadership.
Immediately post-election, Meral Akşener took action and convened a congress. She regarded borrowing 15 MPs from the CHP to secure parliamentary entry in 2018 as her “greatest regret”. She announced the dissolution of the National Alliance and their independent participation in Local Elections. She conveyed her message with an “I told you so” tone. Naturally, she was re-elected with nearly unanimous support. Some of the dissenters had already stepped down during the “table crisis” phase, while others resigned during the election process. The remainder either underwent or are currently undergoing purges. However, at present, Meral Akşener’s Good Party essentially functions as her contracted cult.
Within the CHP, a fierce struggle rages between the “Reformists” and the supporters of Kılıçdaroğlu who hold the stance that “We’ve already initiated the change, receiving the votes of 25 million people from every political orientation; in the presidential election, we achieved the highest vote count in the CHP’s history.” The Reformists, convinced that this is not sustainable and advocating for his resignation, can be broadly categorized into two factions: 1) Those rallying behind İmamoğlu and 2) the “left” Kemalist faction within the CHP. Conventional Kemalists who had formerly departed from or been expelled from the CHP are backing the internal opposition from an external standpoint. In any event, the election has profoundly shaken Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP.
Kılıçdaroğlu now pins his hopes on steering the CHP ship, navigating through treacherous waters, safely to the shore amidst the tempestuous sea as the captain in the impending local elections scheduled for March 2024. If he can succeed, he will strive for re-election as the party president in the pre-election Party Congress. If not, he will strive to defer the congress until post-election times. It might not be surprising if new parties emerge from the fertile grounds of the CHP during the next 5-year legislative term. TİP, which received substantial attention in the bourgeois media during the election phase, could be a potential choice for the leftist Kemalist faction within the CHP.
Regarding the post-election stance of the opportunistic “left” that advocates, “One vote for Kılıçdaroğlu, one vote for the Green Left, or TİP”:
A significant debate is underway within the Green Left Party. Some party executives, who participated under the Green Left banner in the elections, contend that the party has deviated from the “Third Way Line,” viewing this as an error. Assertions are being made that the party will field its own candidates across all locales in the upcoming local elections. These are encouraging shifts. However, the true test lies in how these declarations are actualized during the local elections. Time will tell. To disengage from opportunism, it’s imperative to engage in a comprehensive confrontation and self-critique against lesser-evilism.
The statement issued by the Labour Party (EMEP), a constituent of the Labor and Freedom Alliance, after the elections, exemplifies how such self-critique shouldn’t be:
“Erdoğan and his party have secured victory not only through electoral incentives but also by orchestrating an extensive propaganda campaign. Under the guise of promises for an improved economy, growth, and prosperity, they have marshaled an extensive media apparatus, a communication presidency, and the Pelican gang to ‘mold perceptions.’
The existing situation cannot be altered by merely awaiting election cycles. The way forward entails the unification of workers and laborers to champion their economic and political aspirations. No other viable alternative exists.”
“Shifting the course from the rule of the one-man system hinges not solely on the ballot box but strikes, working-class communities, campuses, women’s activism, rights advocacy, etc. Overcoming and defeating the rule of one-man governance is achievable through the cohesive strength of the oppressed and exploited masses.”
Let’s first say good morning! However, on the other hand, even though this stance may seem self-critical at first glance, there is still no detachment from the hopes pinned on the ballot box. The enemy is still not the capitalist system or the fascist order, but rather the “one-man rule.” Those who approach the issue in this manner will still attach themselves to the tail of the clique that claims to be against the bourgeoisie’s “one-man rule” in the next elections.
And the Epilogue
What will happen in the next period?
*Over the next five years, despite the bourgeois opposition’s continuous assertions of “New elections are looming, with their inability to retain power,” it is unlikely that a situation will arise where the AKP is compelled into an unwelcome election. Erdoğan’s administration, which rejuvenates its legitimacy and assurance through electoral processes, will strive to maximize its influence throughout the forthcoming five-year period. Trying to replace this government via elections within this time frame can only be perceived as an expression of optimism.
*The “improvement” of the economy, detrimental to the public and even unsatisfactory for AKP’s economically disadvantaged supporters, will be a gradual process. A new economic management, led by Mehmet Şimşek and his team, has been designated to facilitate this rectification. This team consists of classical bourgeois market liberals advocating for a pro-market economic approach. Their primary purpose is to restore confidence in Western capital. Temporarily diverging from the ideological inclination to lower policy interest rates, this new economic strategy will place a greater burden on workers than its predecessor. Relative impoverishment will be exacerbated from the workers’ perspective. Workers will be summoned to endure more austerity measures and make additional “sacrifices” for the pursuit of the “Domestic and National Turkish Century.” As articulated by Mehmet Şimşek, the bourgeoisie perceives no alternative but to revert to “rational policies” (The ruthless economic policies of the liberal market economy).
*Bolstered by renewed electoral endorsement, the AKP government will persist in its endeavor to mold Northern Kurdistan-Turkey into an autonomous imperialist force. In foreign affairs, the expansionist Ottoman-Turkist policy will be maintained, underpinned by bolstering the Turkish States Union established during this period. Simultaneously, a pragmatic approach will be adopted in alignment with Turkish bourgeois interests when deemed necessary.
As long as the AKP/MHP partnership remains intact, there’s little expectation for the government to alter its course of resolving the “Kurdish issue” through conflict. This stance will endure both in Northern Kurdistan, Rojava, and South Kurdistan, intensifying campaigns of suppression.
A surge in domestic fascist assaults is to be anticipated. These attacks will chiefly target the revolutionary movement and the Kurdish national movement. However, should the workers’ movement evolve, it will become the foremost objective.
In light of these developments, an upswing in resistance is inevitable. The principal duty of revolutionaries is to amplify, organize, and align themselves within these acts of resistance. It’s of paramount importance for revolutionaries to operate independently from the bourgeois opposition. If these elections have taught any lesson to those willing to learn, it’s precisely this.
13 July 2023
